How an Israeli Airstrike on a Hamas Commander Also Killed Scores of Civilians

A Wall Street Journal investigation found that a mix of intentional tactics and unintended consequences contributed to one of the deadliest bombings of the Gaza war

The alley-like streets and closely spaced buildings of the Block 6 neighborhood in Gaza’s Jabalia refugee camp were packed with people the afternoon of Oct. 31. Some stood in a long line at the local bakery. Others were crammed more tightly than usual into tiny apartments.

Many had ignored or were unable to heed repeated calls from the Israeli military to evacuate farther south to avoid its approaching troops and aerial bombardment, believing they were relatively secure deep inside the sprawling, densely populated camp.

“We were at home, with many relatives and even people we never met before, seeking refuge with us in a place that was safe,” recalled resident Mohammad Tabaq, 27.

Around 3:30 p.m., Israeli warplanes dropped multiple large bombs in a tight pattern on the neighborhood. Satellite photos show The explosion leveled an entire rectangular block, leaving deep craters where more than a dozen buildings had stood.

The strike killed Ibrahim Biari, Hamas’s battalion commander for Jabalia, who Israeli intelligence believed was directing a nearby battle, and dozens of other militants, according to the Israeli military. But it also left the bodies of at least 126 people in the rubble, one of the deadliest attacks of the Gaza war, according to Airwars, a nonprofit affiliated with the University of London that investigates civilian casualties in conflict zones. 

[OCS: Airwars is not a reliable or neutral reporting entity. It is a George Soros not-for-profit propaganda entity that claims to track and archive the international air war against Islamic State and other groups in Iraq, Syria, and Libya and assesses and follows up on credible allegations of civilian casualties. In war, the expectation of collateral damage to property and persons is the cost of war and cannot be avoided.

In comparison, the world had little comment on the Dresden bombing by the Allies. “It is thought that some 25,000–35,000 civilians died in Dresden in the air attacks, though some estimates are as high as 250,000, given the influx of undocumented refugees that had fled to Dresden from the Eastern Front. Most of the victims were women, children, and the elderly.” What is different is that there were few in America’s fifth column seeking to destroy America and its allies from within.]

The decision to bomb an urban neighborhood packed with people in the middle of the afternoon to kill an enemy commander signaled early in the war that Israel was willing to use overwhelming force against Hamas’s leadership, even if it meant risking large numbers of civilian casualties.

[OCS: This is pure propaganda in that Hamas deliberately places weapons and personnel in civilian areas, including private homes, schools, hospitals, and Mosques, and has a policy of using human shields to protect them from attack—knowing that any civilian deaths can be exploited in the media to further its propaganda defense. Any deaths of innocent civilians should be placed squarely on Hamas, not Israel.

In one of her more famous quotes, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir lamented, “When peace comes, we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons. Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us.” That Hamas commanders choose to surround themselves with family and others in on them.]

Among the findings:

•  Israel decided not to warn civilians in the area of an imminent airstrike via phone messages out of fear of giving the militants time to evacuate.

[OCS: What other military warns the enemy before an attack where civilians might be present? Certainly not Hamas or any of the other Islamic fighting entities.]

•  The military appears to have deployed at least two of the largest bombs in its arsenal rather than using smaller targeted munitions.

[OCS: The selection of weapons is an on-the-ground decision, and finger-pointing in hindsight is disingenuous and intellectually dishonest.]

•  Air force commanders attempted to limit collateral damage by aiming guided bombs between buildings and using fuses that slightly delayed the detonations until the munitions had penetrated beneath the surface—but by destroying tunnels they also brought down buildings standing above.

[OCS: I guess the lesson here is not to build terror tunnels under civilian infrastructure, for terrorists to avoid fighting from civilian areas, and to quit using civilians as human shields. Alternatively, the media place blame directly on the terrorists.]

At the time, Biari was commanding Hamas’s forces in northern Gaza from a command center, making him a legitimate and important military target, they said. On Oct. 7, he commanded fighters who attacked the Erez crossing, the main border post, the Israeli military said. He had “directed a terrorist attack at the Israeli port of Ashdod in 2004, resulting in the murder of 13 Israelis” and was involved in firing rockets at Israel for two decades, Israel’s military said.

[OCS: A righteous kill!]

<Source: WSJ>