Welcome to Day + 34…


Remembrance of those who have died to preserve our right to vote for our leadership…

Let us remember the heroes that fought and died to preserve our Constitution and our Country on this 79th anniversary of Pearl Harbor. No other nation has made such heroic contributions to the free world and humanity. As horrific as the attack certainly was, it was not as much an existential threat to our Republic as we are now facing with the fifth column of communists and others who are attempting to destroy our Constitution, Country, and culture from within.

Scare tactics in Georgia run-off election…

It appears that the issue of $1,200 personal stimulus checks is being used as an incentive to urge voters to vote Democrat, suggesting that if the Republicans take the Senate, it is unlikely that there will be another $1,200 payment. Of course, Mitch McConnell and the GOP refuse to issue a definitive statement to counter the Democrat narrative, which claims any stimulus included in the government funding resolution will be targeted at the rich and special interests.


The State of Michigan’s 13th Circuit Court Judge Kevin Elsenheimer, a Republican, has issued a five-page order that requires Antrim County to “maintain, preserve and protect all records in its possession used to tabulate votes in Antrim County, to not turn on the Dominion tabulator in its possession and to not connect the Dominion tabulator in its possession to the internet." The order permits forensic photos to be taken from 22 county precinct tabulators used in the November 3rd election.

Although the 5-page ruling is being heralded as a victory for the Trump legal team, the ruling had nothing to do with the Trump results, but rather the outcome of a Village marijuana issue. This is the county where Dominion-supplied devices appeared to have flipped 6,000 votes from Trump to Biden.


The order notes that voter William Bailey alleges that ballots were damaged during a recounting of the county's ballots conducted Nov. 6, and resulted in a marijuana proposal in the Village of Central Lake changing from a tie vote to passing by one vote. It appears that the Trump team will piggyback on the Bailey lawsuit.

The Trump legal team is also downplaying another loss in the Michigan Court of Appeals that rejected an appeal in a 2-1 decision. The ruling upholds a previous decision by Michigan Court of Claims Judge Cynthia Stephens, who said there was no legal basis or evidence to grant what the campaign requested in a suit filed the day after the November 3rd election. The Michigan Board of State Canvassers certified Michigan's election results on November 23rd.

Sad news…

Former New York Mayor, former United States Associate Attorney General, and former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Rudy Giuliani, has tested positive for the COVID-19 virus. Giuliani, 76, is in one of the highest risk cohorts for the virus and has worked tirelessly as the head of Donald Trump’s election challenge legal team and as Trump’s personal lawyer. The fatigue and strain started to show in these long hearings to resolve election difficulties in a number of states simultaneously.

Pouring gasoline on the fire…

There is little doubt in anyone’s mind that George Soros is a disruptive and divisive individual who is using his various non-profit charitable entities to bring transformative change to America. Funding the election of progressive Secretaries of State, progressive District Attorneys, and funding cultural initiatives that are racist and divisive. So why should we be concerned that an individual who heads an election voting device manufacturer is to be named as the head of Soros’ charities?


Patrick Gaspard to Step Down as Head of Open Society Foundations

Mark Malloch-Brown, former top UN official and Open Society Global Board member, to succeed Gaspard as president.

Patrick Gaspard has announced his decision to step down as president at the end of the year. During his three-year tenure, he confronted significant threats to open societies around the globe, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and the spread of the COVID-19 virus worldwide. Under his capable leadership, the Open Society Foundations have emerged stronger than ever.

Succeeding him as president will be Mark Malloch-Brown, the former UN deputy secretary‐general and UK minister, who currently serves on the Foundations’ Global Board. Malloch-Brown will take over effective January 1.

This year, Gaspard conceptualized and stewarded Open Society’s contribution of $220 million in grants to build power in Black communities, and $200 million in global investments that included support for essential workers and other communities hit hard by COVID-19.

“From his work as a union organizer to his political leadership during the Obama administration to his role as U.S. ambassador to South Africa, Patrick has been a champion of all rights: whether for workers, for women, or for underserved groups,” said George Soros, founder and chair of the Foundations. “His dedication to those challenging power is precisely why I invited Patrick to join Open Society. I have great admiration for the way he led the Foundations in a world beset by illiberalism, and I applaud him.”

“I am deeply honored and humbled by the trust George has placed in me, and I am committed to working with him to make sure we stay faithful to his original vision and values for the Foundations,” said Malloch-Brown. “I am honored to follow Patrick Gaspard and build on what he has begun. 

“Leading this extraordinary institution and working with so many talented people who have committed their lives to social justice is inspiring. I look forward to a strong partnership with our Board, particularly our Deputy Chair Alexander Soros, as we continue our work to reshape the Foundations to confront the new threats to democracy.” <Source>

[OCS: The rumor is that Gaspard is stepping down to take a position within the Biden Administration.]


Because transparency is at the core of what we do, it is important that the facts about us are well known—our origins and our work powering elections around the world.

•    Smartmatic is 100% privately owned. Smartmatic has no ties to political parties or groups in any country and abides by a stringent code of ethics that forbids the company to ever donate to any political campaigns of any kind.

•    Our headquarters were based in Florida for many years, but have since moved to London to service its global client base.

•    George Soros does not have and has never had any ownership stake in Smartmatic.

•    It is no secret that our Chairman Lord Mark Malloch-Brown is a member of a number of non-profit boards addressing global issues from poverty reduction to conflict resolution, including the Global Board of the Open Society Foundation.

This is stated clearly in his official biography. Lord Malloch-Brown is a highly respected global figure whose credentials include former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations and former Vice-Chairman of the World Economic Forum. He also served in the British Cabinet, as Minister of State in the Foreign Office. <Source>

Smartmatic was founded in 2000 in Florida. Since then, it has grown to be the multinational leader in elections technology, having supplied voting systems and services to more than 25 countries, including the United States.

In 2018, Los Angeles County, having designed a completely new voting system, engaged Smartmatic for systems integration, engineering and manufacturing of Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP). Los Angeles County voters will start using this new voting system in the 2020 elections. Election officials cited Smartmatic’s unparalleled experience in providing secure, advanced election technology and services to election commissions throughout the world as the primary reason for choosing Smartmatic as their VSAP partner.

Smartmatic participated in its first US election during the 2005-2006 election cycle providing technology and support services to clients of its subsidiary, Sequoia Voting Systems, in 300 jurisdictions across 16 states, including some 60,000 voting devices to the city of Chicago and to Cook County, Illinois.

In 2020 and 2021, Smartmatic will introduce in the United States its most current multi-functional voting machine based on the VSAP, along with state-of-the-art e-Poll books, scanners and vote tabulators. <Source>

[OCS: Nothing to see here, move along.]

California decertification/recertification

On August 3, 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen withdrew approval and granted conditional re-approval to Sequoia Voting Systems optical scan and DRE voting machines after a "review of the voting machines certified for use in California in March 2007" found "significant security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia system" and "pervasive structural weaknesses" which raise "serious questions as to whether the Sequoia software can be relied upon to protect the integrity of elections." <Source>

What the State of California found in 2007 mirrors today’s concerns…

Excerpts from July 20, 2007, Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting System…

We found significant security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia system. The nature of these weaknesses raises serious questions as to whether the Sequoia software can be relied upon to protect the integrity of elections. Every software mechanism for transmitting election results and every software mechanism for updating software lacks reliable measures to detect or prevent tampering. We detail these weaknesses, and their implications, in Chapters 3 and 4.

In certain cases, audit mechanisms may be able to detect and recover from some attacks, depending on county-specific procedures; other attacks may be more difficult to detect after-the-fact even with very rigorous audits.

There were numerous programming, logic, and architectural errors present in the software we reviewed. Some of these errors may be relatively harmless and reflect the large size and heterogeneous nature of the codebase. But other errors we found clearly have serious security implications. Many of the most significant vulnerabilities we found—those likely to be especially useful to an attacker seeking to alter election results—arise from four pervasive structural weaknesses, discussed in detail in Chapter 3:

* Data Integrity. The Sequoia system lacks effective safeguards against corrupted or malicious data injected onto removable media, especially for devices entrusted to poll workers and other temporary staff with limited authority. This lack of input validation has potentially serious consequences, including:

– Precinct election results stored on DRE Results Cartridges and optical scan memory packs are not effectively protected against tampering. A poll worker with physical access to a Results Cartridge or Memory Pack before results are counted (e. g. when returning results to the county elections board) can change recorded votes, and, in some cases, can introduce spurious results for other precincts. Under some conditions, a corrupted Results Cartridge may be able to cause damage to the WinEDS system itself when it is loaded for vote counting.

The safeguards against introduction of corrupt firmware into the precinct voting hardware are largely ineffective. An individual with even brief access to polling station hardware can tamper with installed firmware in a way that causes votes and paper trails to be recorded incorrectly, security logs to be corrupted, or ballots to be presented to voters incorrectly. Under some configurations and conditions, corrupt firmware may be able to be spread virally from compromised hardware and may persist across more than one election.

* Cryptography. Many of the security features of the Sequoia system, particularly those that protect the integrity of precinct results, employ cryptography. Unfortunately, in every case we examined the cryptography is easily circumvented. Many cryptographic functions are implemented incorrectly, based on weak algorithms with known flaws, or used in an ineffective or insecure manner. Of particular concern is the fact that virtually all cryptographic key material is permanently hardcoded in the system (and is apparently identical in all Sequoia hardware shipped to different jurisdictions). This means that an individual who gains temporary access to similar hardware (inside California or elsewhere) can extract and obtain the secret cryptographic keys that protect elections in every California county that uses the system.

* Access Control. The access control and other computer security mechanisms that protect against unauthorized use of central vote counting computers and polling place equipment are easily circumvented. In particular, the security features and audit logs in the WinEDS back-end system (used for ballot preparation, voting machine configuration, absentee ballot processing, and post-election vote counting) are largely ineffective against tampering by insider attackers who gain access to WinEDS computers or to the network to which the WinEDS computers are attached.

* Software Engineering. The software suffers from numerous programming errors, many of which have a high potential to introduce or exacerbate security weaknesses. These include buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities, and type mismatch errors. In general, the software does not reflect defensive software engineering practices normally associated with high-assurance critical systems. There are many instances of poor or absent error and exception handling, and several cases where the software behavior does not match the comments and documentation. Some of these problems lead to potentially exploitable vulnerabilities that we identified, but even where there may not be an obvious vulnerability identified, the presence of such errors reduces our overall confidence in the soundness of the system as a whole. Aspects of some of the weaknesses we discovered appear to have been reported in prior studies, most prominently in the 2006 Alameda County report, while others appear not to have been discovered (or publicly disclosed) previously.

Whether the vulnerabilities reported here represent practical threats, and whether their exploitation can be prevented or detected, depends heavily on the physical controls and procedures used in individual counties. We did not examine county-specific controls and procedures in our analysis. However, we caution that effective mitigation of many of the vulnerabilities discussed in this report will, at the very minimum, place considerable additional pressure on physical security features (such as locks and seals) and human procedures (such as two-person control by poll workers).  many of the physical security features and procedures used in the Sequoia system appear to have been engineered under the assumption that the underlying software is considerably more secure than it actually is, and thus may not provide sufficient protection in light of the vulnerabilities discussed here.


McBottom line…

We keep going on. Even when the systems are defective by design and our elected officials look the other way.

We are so screwed.

-- steve

“Nullius in verba.”-- take nobody's word for it!

“Beware of false knowledge; it is more dangerous than ignorance.”-- George Bernard Shaw

“Progressive, liberal, Socialist, Marxist, Democratic Socialist -- they are all COMMUNISTS.”

“The key to fighting the craziness of the progressives is to hold them responsible for their actions, not their intentions.” – OCS

"The object in life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane." -- Marcus Aurelius

“A people that elect corrupt politicians, imposters, thieves, and traitors are not victims... but accomplices” -- George Orwell